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Abstract—Wireless communications are vulnerable against
radio frequency (RF) jamming which might be caused either
intentionally or unintentionally. A particular subset of wireless
networks, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANET) which incorporate
a series of safety-critical applications, may be a potential target
of RF jamming with detrimental safety effects. To ensure secure
communication and defend it against this type of attacks, an
accurate detection scheme must be adopted.
In this paper we introduce a detection scheme that is based
on supervised learning. The machine-learning algorithms, K-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Random Forests (RF), utilize a
series of features among which is the metric of the variations of
relative speed (VRS) between the jammer and the receiver that
is passively estimated from the combined value of the useful and
the jamming signal at the receiver. To the best of our knowledge,
this metric has never been utilized before in a machine-learning
detection scheme in the literature. Through offline training and
the proposed KNN-VRS, RF-VRS classification algorithms, we
are able to efficiently detect various cases of Denial of Service
Attacks (DoS) jamming attacks, differentiate them from cases of
interference as well as foresee a potential danger successfully and
act accordingly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles capable of navigating unpredictable
real-world environments with little human feedback are a real-
ity today [10]. Autonomous vehicle control imposes very strict
requirements on the security of the wireless communication
channels [9] used by a fleet of vehicles [5]. Moreover, with
the Intelligent Vehicle Grid technology, the vehicle becomes
a formidable sensor platform, absorbing information from the
environment or from other vehicles ( called as Internet of Ve-
hicles IoV) and feeding it to other vehicles and infrastructure
so as to assist in safe navigation and traffic management. As
a result, the term smart city has been coined to describe the
city of tomorrow in which modern intelligent technologies,
such as IT communication systems, sensors, machine learning,
data analytics, come together to provide better services to the
citizens.
Wireless communications, however, are vulnerable against
a wide range of attacks. An attack that is particularly hard to
detect in every wireless network is the RF jamming attack [8].
In a VANET, RF attack detection is even more challenging
due to the constant and rapid changes in topology and the high
mobility of the nodes as well as due to the presence of a variety
of different jammers . These jamming scenarios affect either
the communication between vehicles (V2V communication)
or the communication between the vehicles and the roadside
units, namely RSUs (V2R communication).
Over the last few years, there have been several experi-
mental approaches for jamming detection [4], [8], [18], [26],
some of which suggest the use of machine learning [7], [18].
However, only [18] examines closely the adoption of machine
learning techniques for jamming detection. Furthermore, none
of the above works that propose machine-learning based
schemes, have investigated the relative speed, which is an
application layer metric, because vehicular wireless channels
exhibit rapid changes. However with our work, we prove that
this metric can be used in a realistic scenario with a minimum
number of assumptions leading to an increase in the accuracy
of the classification procedure.
In this paper we propose the use of RF signals for estimating
the relative speed between the jammer and the receiver and
use the variations of it as an extra feature in the classification
process. The proposed metric is combined with the physical
layer metrics leading to a cross-layer approach for offline
training. This set of cross-layer features are utilized for the
classification of different jamming scenarios. In the general
case, jamming reduces the receiver signal to interference and
noise ratio (SINR), a problem that can be addressed with
classic communication algorithms. In several applications,
however, it is critical to detect accurately the presence of a
jammer (Jx), i.e. the precise reason behind the reduction in
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the packet-delivery-ratio
(PDR), and even more so, the nature of the attack. So, it
is difficult to determine whether the reason for the SINR
reduction is a jamming attack or unintentional interference.
This is the main motivation for the relative speed metric input
in a jamming detection scheme. However, our results indicate
that the proposed scheme can effectively differentiate a case
of jamming attack from that of an interfering wireless source.
This is a very crucial point because each of the two cases
can be treated with a different solution. Especially, in the case
of interference, an Interference Cancellation (IC) model [3]
or a spectral evasion (channel surfing, spatial retreats) scheme
could be applied.
A. Contributions
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold:
• A novel detection scheme is introduced that leverages
the use of a new metric from the application layer that
is passively estimated by the physical layer, namely the
variations of relative speed (VRS).
• Based on a series of cross-layer data (among which is
the VRS metric that is calculated using the estimated
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relative speed) detection of a potential threat as well as
differentiation between a case of jamming and a case of
interference is achieved.
Our jamming detection scheme could be applicable to a
platoon of vehicles in which an exterior or an interior attacker
can cause significant instability in the Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC) of the vehicle stream [6]. For the
validation of our approach, one interference-only scenario and
two jamming attack scenarios have been created and tested.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
provides an overview of the related work in the domain of
attack (not only jamming) detection, Section III describes
the adopted topology and the channel model, Section IV
describes the methodology behind the estimation of the relative
speed, Section V presents the proposed machine-learning
based jamming detection system, Section VI describes the
simulation setup, Section VII presents the experimental results
and comparisons and Section VIII summarizes the significance
of our approach and concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine-learning based approaches for attack detection in
vehicular ad-hoc networks have been primarily reported in [18]
and [7]. Pun˜al et al. [18] use several metrics like the Noise
and Channel Busy Ratio (CBR), Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR),
Maximum Inactive Time (Max IT), Received Signal Strength
(RSS) to detect attacks with machine learning techniques and
examine the cases of reactive and constant jammers. Azogu et
al. [4] have proposed a new mechanism, called the Hideaway
Strategy according to which all nodes should remain silent
while the network is under a jamming attack. Bißmeyer et
al. [27] propose a detection scheme that is based on the
verification of vehicle movement data and on the notion that
a certain space will be occupied by only one vehicle at a
certain time. Hamieh et al. [8] focus on the detection of
the reactive jammer. The proposed method, is based on the
correlation coefficient (CC) and the error probability (EP).
Each node compares the calculated value of CC with the
EP and the network is considered under a jamming attack
if CC>EP. Malebary et al. [15] propose a two-phase jamming
detection method that utilizes metrics such as the RSS, the
Packet Delivery/Send Ratio (PDSR) and the Packet Loss Ratio
(PLR) as well consistency checks to distinguish a jamming
from a no-jamming situation.
RoselinMary et al. [19] present an approach that is based
on the detection of malicious and irrelevant packets using the
number of broadcast packets per second (frequency) and the
velocity of the vehicle that the packets are sent from. Shafiq
et al. [21] investigated an attack detection approach based on
the number of packets that are received from each vehicle,
thus indicating an attack if this number is greater than the
threshold value. Xu et al. [26] indicated the inability of the
PDR to differentiate jamming from interference cases. For
that reason, two detection schemes are proposed. The first one
utilizes signal strength measurements as a consistency check to
determine if the PDR value is due to jamming or interference.
Figure 1: Topology. Blue arrows represent the LOS V2V or
V2R wireless communication. While, purple arrows represent
the NLOS components that are caused by a Reflected Static
Object.
The second uses location information as the consistency check.
Several jamming attack models are presented and evaluated.
Sharanya et al. [22] propose the use of the Support Vector
Machine (SVM) algorithm with Modified Fading Memory
(MFM) so as to classify legitimate and malicious nodes. The
purpose of the MFM is to reduce the computational overhead
for the machine learning algorithm by only considering as el-
igible nodes those in the range of the VANET communication
only for limited time.
Last, Karagiannis et al. [11] propose a RF jamming attack
detection scheme using an unsupervised learning with cluster-
ing. The novelty of this paper is that the relative speed metric is
utilized between the jammer and the receiver, along with other
parameters, in order to differentiate intentional from uninten-
tional jamming as well as identify the unique characteristics
of each jamming attack. However, this relative speed metric is
obtained from the on-board wireless communication devices at
the receiver vehicle and is not estimated through the wireless
medium.
We must mention here that in all the previous work that
propose machine-learning based schemes the relative speed
has not been considered as a classification feature. Our pro-
posed system is the first in literature that uses the point-to-
point RF communication in order to estimate the relative speed
metric. Variations of relative speed are used for effectively
differentiating interference from jamming, by distinguishing
the unique characteristics of each attack. Moreover, we use
a supervised learning scheme, in which the input data is
utilized by the wireless communication between transmitter
and receiver with the presence of a jammer. This supervised
learning scheme feeds that data back into the supervised
learning algorithms as training data and uses these algorithms
to accurately classify all the kinds of attacks.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Topology
The topology we adopt in our work (Figure 1) involves
a moving vehicle, namely Rx, that serves as the target of
the jammer, another vehicle or a RSU (namely Tx) that is
used as the transmitter of the useful signal and the jamming
vehicle that tries to intervene in the communication between
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Rx and Tx. The travelling speed of the Rx, namely uRx , is
equal with the travelling speed of the Tx, namely uTx , and is
bound to the limitations of an urban environment. Last, there
is a static object in the area that causes the multipath fading
effects from reflection. Upon spotting its target, the jammer
begins following it and starts jamming either continuously
or periodically (in order to stay undetected for as long as
possible). This jamming behavior summarizes all the potential
Denial of Service Attack (DoS) jamming attacks.
B. Rician Fading Model
In our work, we adopt the Rician fading model that is a
channel model which includes path loss and also Rayleigh
fading [25]. When a signal is transmitted, whether it is a
useful signal or a jamming one, this channel adds multipath
fading in addition to thermal noise. It is assumed that a LOS
ray and N−1 NLOS rays exist in the area.The baseband signal
that the receiver receives from the jammer is
y(t) =
N−1∑
n=0
((h1(t, n)xpilot[N − n]
√
P1
+ h2(t, n)s[N − n]
√
P2) + w(t)
(1)
where
h1(t, n) = Ray1(n)
+
1
dist21(t)
)ej(2pi/λ)(fc+fd,max cos θ1)τ1(n)δ(t− τ1(n))
(2)
and
h2(t, n) = Ray2(n)
+
1
dist22(t)
)ej(2pi/λ)(fc+fd,max cos θ2)τ2(n)δ(t− τ2(n))
(3)
Where, h1(t, n), h2(t, n) are the Rician fading channel models
between transmitter-receiver and jammer-receiver respectively.
This type of channel model includes path loss and also
Rayleigh fading. Moreover, Ray1(n), Ray2(n) are complex
Gaussian variables capturing the Rayleigh fading between
transmitter - receiver and jammer - receiver, and xpilot[N −
n], s[N − n] are the symbols that are transmitted from the
transmitter and the jammer respectively, for which the BPSK
modulation is assumed. This modulation scheme is preferred
because achieves lower bit error rate and we want a re-
liable communication between Tx and Rx. Moreover, this
modulation scheme is the most robust in a high interference
environment. In the above equation, fc is the carrier frequency,
fd,max is the maximum Doppler shift. P1 and P2 are the
transmission power per symbol of the useful and of the
jamming signal respectively and w(t) is the channel noise at the
time instant t. The terms ds, dj correspond to the distance be-
tween the transmitter and the reflected object and between the
jammer and the reflected object. While the terms r1n(t), r2n(t)
correspond to the distance between the transmitter and the
receiver and between the jammer and the receiver. In (2), (3)
the distance that travels the LOS rays is represented with the
dist1(t) = r1n(t), dist2(t) = r2n(t) respectively. On the other
hand, the distance that the NLOS rays travel is represented
with the dist1(t) = 2ds − r1n(t), dist2(t) = 2dj − r2n(t)
respectively. Moreover, fc is the carrier frequency, fd,max is
the maximum Doppler shift, θ1 is the incidence AOD between
the vector of speed ~uTx and the vector of signal sent from
the transmitter, θ2 is the incidence AOD between the vector
of speed ~uJx and the vector of signal sent from the jammer,
(τ1 = dist1(t)/c, τ2 = dist2(t)/c) is the excess delay time
for the transmitter and jammer signal ray (that may be caused
due to ground reflection) and t is the current time instant.
For the rest of the paper, we will use the parameter γ11 as
the transmitter - receiver complex amplitude associated with
the LOS path and the parameter γ22 as the jammer - receiver
complex amplitude. The above complex amplitude values are
known at the receiver.
C. System Overview
In our system model, a fixed number of known pilot symbols
are being sent through the wireless IEEE 802.11p standard
[15] over consecutive time instants from the transmitter to
the receiver. At the same time, the jammer simultaneously
transmits over consecutive time instants random jamming
symbols to the receiver. Using the pilots, the LOS channel and
the N −1 NLOS channels between Jx−Rx will be estimated
by the receiver.
System Description: The basic idea of our system is to
first estimate the relative speed between the jammer and the
receiver, exploiting the RF Doppler shift. Subsequently, we
use the variations of the estimated relative speed as a new
feature in a supervised machine learning algorithm for RF
jamming attack detection. Along with the relative speed from
the application layer, we use cross-layer data that we obtain
from the physical layer, such as the Received Signal Strength
and Interference (RSSI), the Signal to Interference and Noise
Ratio (SINR) and the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). Two
classification algorithms are investigated, namely the k-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN) and the Random Forests (RF) algorithm
respectively.
D. Jamming Scenarios
We assume that the jammer continuously transmits with the
appropriate transmission power, with the purpose of overload-
ing the wireless medium creating, thus a DoS attack [17].
In our work, we also created three different attack scenarios
-namely Interference Scenario, Smart Attack Scenario and
Constant Attack Scenario - each representing a jamming
attack case that could affect a VANET in real life.
In the Interference Scenario, we assume that a moving,
intentional jammer is not present in the network so as to eval-
uate the efficiency of our method in differentiating jamming
from the interference level of the external environment. The
vehicle travels, when, at some point, passes through an area
with significant RF interference by which its communication
with the other vehicles or with the RSU is affected.
In the Smart Attack Scenario, the performance of a more
intelligent jammer is evaluated [13]. Specifically a smart
1(γ1 = (Ray1(n) +
1
r21n(t)
))
2(γ2 = (Ray2(n) +
1
r22n(t)
))
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jammer starts following the victim-vehicle, while transmitting
a jamming signal. When the jammer reaches its target at a
distance of about 10m, retreats to a safe position and transmits
in a reactive way. The most common alteration in literature is
when the jammer keeps changing its transmission power, thus
achieving the same disrupt or thwart in the communication
(DoS attack) without the need of changing its distance from
the target. With our Smart Attack, we aim at affecting the
communication of the Tx-Rx pair, with the jammer detection
being more difficult, while using the relative speed metric as
feature. For that reason the ”smart” jammer retreats to a safe
position. The jammer is designed to start transmitting upon
sensing energy above a certain threshold. We set the latter
to −86dBm as it is empirically determined to be a good
tradeoff between jammer sensitivity and false transmission
detection rate. If the detected energy exceeds the threshold
during a certain time span (Tdetection = 12µs), an ongoing
802.11p transmission is assumed by the jammer and starts its
transmission for a duration of (Tduration = 84µs). This smart
jammer is designed to affect the header of the 802.11p frame
sent from Tx to Rx.
In the Constant Attack Scenario, we study the case of a
constant jammer that follows the victim-vehicle while trans-
mitting constantly at a minimum power. When the jammer
reaches its target, begins transmitting constantly with its full
power without any intention to stay undetected as at the Smart
Attack Scenario.
IV. RELATIVE SPEED METRIC ESTIMATION
In this section, we present the relative speed metric (∆u)
that indicates the relative speed between the jammer and the
victim’s vehicle. Based on the obtained values, the Variations
of Relative Speed (VRS) metric is created and then used for
the classification. To the best of our knowledge, this metric
has never been used before for jamming detection. The relative
speed metric as firstly defined in [11] is:
∆u = |~uJx − ~uRx | (4)
Where, ~uJx , ~uRx the speed of jammer and the speed of
receiver respectively.
From the equation (3), the N multipath combined channels
(h1 + h2) can be estimated, using a MMSE estimator [25].
After, exploiting the Doppler phenomenon for modeling the
LOS hLOS2 channel between jammer and receiver, we can
estimate the defined above relative speed metric.
V. PROPOSED DETECTION SYSTEM BASED ON
SUPERVISED LEARNING
A. Proposed Algorithm
To make our detection method robust, apart from the phys-
ical and network metrics used in related works, we introduce
and use the VRS metric from the application layer that can
be effectively estimated by the RF signals interchange in the
physical layer (see Section IV). Our method uses this new
metric, as an extra feature in a cross-layer approach, along
with other metrics from the physical layer for the classification
process. All these metrics are presented in Table I.
Table I: Metrics that are jointly processed by the classification
algorithms
Metrics
∆u
RSSI
SINR
PDR
To create the VRS metric for the classification process we,
initially, make three fundamental assumptions:
• When the relative speed is equal to zero and remains
unchanged, it indicates the existence of a constant jammer
that follows the victim-vehicle.
• When the relative speed is not equal to zero and remains
unchanged, it indicates the absence of a moving jammer
as the relative speed is equal to the speed of the vehicle.
• When the relative speed is not equal to zero for a
period of time and then becomes zero while remaining
unchanged, it indicates the existence of a jammer that
begins following the target after reaching it.
The common characteristic of these assumptions is that the
speed of the participating non-malicious vehicles remains
unchanged and is always greater than zero.
However, in a real-life scenario, such as the one that we
study, the speed - and as a consequence the relative speed
- may not remain constant during the observation period.
In other words, if we want to accurately model an urban
environment, we have to consider the fact that the vehicles can
alter their traveling speed. To handle these real-life situations,
while still using the previously presented assumptions, we
introduce the Variations of Relative Speed Algorithm 1
(VRS Algorithm).
The VRS Algorithm detects changes in the relative speed of
the provided observations. To ensure that, the relative speed
and the speed from the previous as well as the subsequent
observations are used along with a series of control flow
statements. The algorithm is divided into two main parts, with
the first examining the case in which the relative speed value
is not equal to zero and the second examining the opposite
case, each one with its own logical checks to determine the
existence of a threat or not.
The ∆u and u variables represent an array of estimated
relative speed values and travelling speed values respectively,
M is the number of the available observations upon which
the algorithm operates, vrs is an array used to store the
classification result (A for attack or NA for not attack) of
the current observation and the trigger is a binary variable
which indicates the presence of a jammer (value is equal to 1)
or its absence (value is equal to 0). The NA and A values are
two extreme and distinct values able to differentiate the attack
from the no attack cases and guide the classification process.
B. Supervised Learning Algorithms
The supervised learning methods that are used are KNN [24]
and Random Forests [14]. Their choice does not affect the
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efficiency of our algorithm as our proposed feature is not con-
strained by the type of the supervised learning algorithm that
is used. The VRS Algorithm 1 generates the new metric which
is used as an extra feature in the classification process without
being affected at all by the machine learning algorithms that
are utilized. Both supervised learning techniques are very
popular, with the KNN being robust against noisy training data
like the ones obtained from a real-life urban environment and
Random Forests being one of the most accurate algorithms,
due to the fact that it reduces the chance of over-fitting (by
averaging several trees, there is a significantly lower chance of
over-fitting). As it is previously stated, our detection scheme
is currently based on offline training that leverages the use
of a dataset of collected measurements in order to train the
classifier.
VI. SIMULATION SETUP
Figures 2 - 4, illustrate the behavior of the jammer
by presenting the SINR versus Time for every one of the
three scenarios namely Interference Scenario, Smart Attack
Scenario and Constant Attack Scenario .
Figure 2: SINR vs Time for the Rician Fading Model in the
Interference Scenario
Figure 3: SINR vs Time for the Rician Fading Model in the
Smart Attack Scenario
A. Supervised Learning Testing Cases
Beyond the scenarios that we use to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the overall system, we also created a series of test
Algorithm 1 VRS Algorithm
1: M = number of observations
2: vrs = matrix(nrow = M,ncol = 1)
3: k = 1
4: if ∆u[k] == ∆u[k+1] then
5: vrs← NA
6: trigger = 0
7: else if ∆u[k] 6= ∆u[k+1] then
8: vrs← A
9: trigger = 1
10: end if
11:
12: k + +
13: while (k < M) do
14: if ∆u[k] 6= 0 then
15: if ∆u[k] 6= ∆u[k-1] then
16: if ∆u[k] == u[k] then
17: vrs← NA
18: trigger = 0
19: else if ∆u[k] 6= u[k] then
20: vrs← A
21: trigger = 1
22: end if
23: else if ∆u[k]==∆u[k-1] then
24: if ∆u[k] 6= u[k] then
25: vrs← A
26: trigger = 1
27: else if ∆u[k] == u[k] then
28: if hasNext == T then
29: if (∆u[k-1]==u[k-1]&&
30: ∆u[k+1]==u[k+1]) then
31: vrs← NA
32: trigger = 0
33: else
34: vrs← A
35: trigger = 1
36: end if
37: else if hasNext == F then
38: if trigger == 0 then
39: vrs← NA
40: trigger = 0
41: else
42: vrs← A
43: trigger = 1
44: end if
45: end if
46: end if
47: end if
cases that allow us to explore deeper the proposed system
depending on the set of observations that is utilized for both
training and testing.
These cases only affect how the training and testing is
performed, without any further implications in the scenarios.
They are created in such a way so as to provide us with a
comparison between the use or not of the VRS metric in the
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Algorithm 1 VRS Algorithm (continued)
48: else if ∆u[k] == 0 then
49: if u[k] 6= 0 then
50: vrs← A
51: trigger = 1
52: else if u[k] == 0 then
53: if ∆u[k-1] == u[k-1] then
54: if trigger == 0 then
55: vrs← NA
56: trigger = 0
57: else
58: vrs← A
59: trigger = 1
60: end if
61: else if ∆u[k-1] 6= u[k-1] then
62: vrs← A
63: trigger = 1
64: end if
65: end if
66: end if
67: end while
68: return vrs
Figure 4: SINR vs Time for the Rician Fading Model in the
Constant Attack Scenario
classification process under various circumstances, that would,
in turn, highlight its significance.
• Train and test with data from the same speed value with
the VRS metric (Same KNN-VRS and Same RF-VRS
case): the prediction model is trained and tested using
observations collected under the speed of 15 m/s, with the
use of the VRS metric. To avoid testing with ”previously
seen data”, thus leading to biased classification results,
we have to ensure that the training and testing sets are
completely separated.
• Train and test with data from the same speed value with-
out the VRS metric (Same KNN and Same RF case):
similar to the previous case, with the only difference
being the omission of the VRS metric in the classification
process.
• Train and test under different speed values with the VRS
metric (Different KNN-VRS and Same RF-VRS case):
the previously trained prediction model is tested using
Table II: Simulation Parameters
Evaluation Parameters in Veins Simulator Values
uTx,Rx 15m/sec.
distTx,Rx 35m
distinitial 200m
PTx,Jx 100mW
Minimum sensitivity (Pth) -69dBm to -85dBm
Transmission Range 130-300 meters
fc 5.9GHz
Doppler shift for ∆u = 120km/h ±655.5 Hz
distref 100m
data that was collected under a speed of 25 m/s, that is
under a speed different from the one the training of the
prediction model was based on.
• Train and test with data from different speed values
without the VRS metric (Different KNN and Differ-
ent RF case): similar to the previous case but without
the utilization of the VRS metric as an extra feature in
the classification process.
• Train and test with normalized data from the same
speed value with the VRS metric (Norm KNN-VRS and
Norm RF-VRS case): the data is normalized prior to its
use training and in testing. By normalization, we refer to
the process of changing the data so as to belong in the 0
- 1 range. Both training and testing are conducted on data
collected under a speed of 15 m/s but without common
observations in the two sets (as stated before).
• Train and test with normalized data from the same
speed value without the VRS metric (Norm KNN and
Norm RF case): similar to the previous case but without
the VRS metric.
B. Detection System Assumptions
Regarding the details of our simulation setup, the speed
of the vehicles involved in the legitimate communication
(uTx,Rx), the initial distance between the jammer and the
pair of Rx - Tx (distinitial), the distance that separates
the receiver from the transmitter throughout the course of
the simulation (distTx,Rx) as well as the power of all the
the transmitted signals (PTx,Jx) and the reference distance
(distref ) with which the path loss component is estimated,
are presented in Table II.
The power of all the transmitted signals is measured in
milliwatts (mW) and is converted in the dBm scale prior to
using it in the algorithm. The signal that is transmitted from
both the jammer and the transmitter consists of streams that are
500 bits long. For each one of the three scenarios, a number of
1000 packets is transmitted. Using a time sample of 0.1 sec,
we simulate the system for 100 seconds (for each scenario)
and obtain 1000 measurements (for each scenario).
We used the Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) and
the OMNET++/Veins [23]. SUMO is adopted as our traffic
simulator and OMNET++ is used to simulate the wireless
communication. Part of the Erlangen city map is used for
conducting the simulations. The evaluation parameters in the
Veins simulator are also presented in Table II.
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VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
To underline the significance of our proposed system, we
proceed and compare the cases presented previously. In par-
ticular, for each supervised learning testing case presented in
section VI-A, we execute a simulation which lasts 300 seconds
and is equally split in the three jamming scenarios discussed
in Section III-D, so that the first 100 sec represent the Smart
Attack Scenario, the next 100 sec the Interference Scenario and
the last 100 sec the Constant Attack Scenario. All the above
Scenarios are independent each other and simply presented at
consecutive time instants.
Prior to presenting the classification results, we have to
define the size of the training and testing sets as well as the
total number of observations used, so as to make them more
interpretable. Each simulation, that is each case from VI-A,
utilizes a set of 3000 observations, equally split into the three
attack scenarios examined. To avoid overfitting3, only 30% of
the total number of the observations is used for training while
the remaining 70% for testing.
Based on the ratio above, in our simulations, the number
of the observations in the training set is 941 (that is 293 ob-
servations from the Interference Scenario, 319 from the Smart
Attack Scenario and 329 from the Constant Attack Scenario)
whereas the number of the observations in the testing set is
2059 (that is 703 observations from the Interference Scenario,
685 from the Smart Attack Scenario and 671 from the Constant
Attack Scenario), randomly chosen but almost equally split
among the three scenarios in both cases.
To present the classification results, the confusion matrix
is used [12]. Each row of the matrix represents the instances
belonging to a predicted class while each column represents
the instances in an actual class. To evaluate the performance
of our detection system in the various scenarios previously
described, we will use the accuracy of the prediction model.
Accuracy is a measure that is obtained from the confusion
matrix and is equal to the ratio of all the correctly predicted
labels over all the predictions. The correctly predicted labels
are the labels of the main diagonal of the confusion matrix.
A. Same KNN/RF-VRS and Same KNN/RF cases
Starting from the first case, the accuracy of the prediction
model achieved is equal to 82.27% for the KNN and 80.04%
for the Random Forests algorithm. An example of the above
defined confusion matrix for the calculation of the accuracy of
our prediction model is the subsequent confusion matrix for
the KNN.
Scenario Interference Smart At-
tack
Constant
Attack
Interference 703 0 0
Smart
Attack
0 494 174
Constant At-
tack
0 191 497
Table III: Confusion matrix for the Same KNN-VRS case
3Overfitting occurs when the classifier tends to memorize the training set
and thus generalize poorly when facing previously unseen data
On the contrary, when omitting the VRS metric, we not
only observe a drop in the classification accuracy but also a
high confusion between interference and jamming cases. The
accuracy of the prediction model is, now, equal to 79.16%
and 76.54% for the KNN and the Random Forests algorithms
respectively. So, the impact of the VRS metric is evident.
Apart from the fact that it increases the success rate of the
classification (compared to the cases where the VRS metric
is omitted) it ensures, almost perfectly, the differentiation
between the cases of intentional and unintentional jamming.
B. Different KNN/RF-VRS and Different KNN/RF cases
As stated previously, these cases examine the situation in
which training and testing are based on observations that were
collected under different speed. The accuracy achieved while
using the VRS metric as an extra feature in the classification
process is equal to 66.97% for KNN and 69.84% for Random
Forests respectively.
On the other hand, when the VRS metric is not used,
the accuracy of the prediction model is reduced to 56% for
the KNN and to 55.37% for the Random Forests algorithm.
Figures 5 and 6 present the results for the Random Forests-
based classification model.
Figure 5: SINR vs Time for the Different RF-VRS case,
with the Smart Attack Scenario represented by the red, the
Interference Scenario by the black and the Constant Attack
Scenario by the green color.
Figure 6: SINR vs Time for the Different RF case, with the
Smart Attack Scenario represented by the red, the Interference
Scenario by the black and the Constant Attack Scenario by the
green color.
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The color of the figures indicates the class in which each
observation is predicted to belong to. The Smart Attack Sce-
nario is represented by the red, the Interference Scenario by
the black and the Constant Attack Scenario by the green color.
The appearance of more than one colors in each scenario, that
is in each 100 seconds (as described in VI-B), indicates the
existance of misclassifications.
Based on the classification results presented above, we can
reach an important conclusion. When testing the prediction
model with observations from a different speed - compared to
the one used in training - we observe an overall reduction in
accuracy. With the VRS metric, not only the accuracy of the
prediction model is significantly increased (in both supervised
algorithms examined in this paper), but there is also a clear
seperation between interference and jamming.
In addition to that, if we compare the previous classification
results of the Same KNN and Same RF cases with that are
derived when no normalization is applied to the data prior to
their use, we observe that there is no significant increase in
accuracy results. Thus we conclude to that a normalization of
the measurements is not necessary.
C. Same KNN/RF-VRS and Same KNN/RF cases for higher
speed
As it is already stated, our RF jamming attack detection
system is based on offline training, using a dataset of mea-
surements collected under a speed of 15m/s so as to train the
classifier prior to its use for testing. For the sake of completion
and in order to determine the behavior of our detection scheme
when the training is conducted with data collected under
a higher speed, we examine the Same KNN/RF-VRS and
Same KNN/RF cases presented previously using as training
data measurements from the 25m/s speed range.
For the Same KNN/RF-VRS case, the accuracy of the
prediction model achieved is equal to 94.46% for the KNN
and 94.61% for the Random Forests algorithm. For the
Same KNN/RF case, on the other hand, the calculated ac-
curacy is equal to 88.68% for the KNN and 89.22% for the
Random Forests algorithm respectively.
From the classification results presented above two obser-
vations could be made. Our first observation could be that
both the omission and the use of the VRS metric as an
extra feature in the classification process lead to increase in
accuracy compared to the results obtained in VII-A. The use,
however, of the VRS metric apart from the high classification
accuracy, also leads to a clear differentiation between cases of
intentional and unintentional jamming, something that is not
obvious when the metric is omitted.
Our second observation concerns the overall increase in
classification accuracy when the training is done using data
from a higher speed. The higher classification accuracy derives
from the fact that the increase in speed adversely affects the
effect of the jamming. For instance, in the Constant Attack
Scenario the jammer overtakes the pair of Rx - Tx faster,
in the Interference Scenario the the pair of Rx - Tx remains
in the jamming area for a shorter period of time and in the
Smart Attack Scenario the jammer reaches its target faster,
thus the gradual effect of the jamming observed at lower
speeds is greatly reduced. All the above lead to a significant
increase in the quality of the measurements obtained, hence
leading to higher classification accuracy as well as a to better
distinction between the different types of jammers affecting
the communication, as can be seen in Figure 7 for the KNN
algorithm.
Figure 7: Plot with train 25m/s for the Same KNN case,
with the Smart Attack Scenario represented by the red, the
Interference Scenario by the black and the Constant Attack
Scenario by the green color.
In the following Table IV we summarize the classification
accuracy, exploiting the usage of the proposed VRS metric as
an extra feature, achieved while training with measurements
from a speed of 15m/s and a speed of 25m/s respectively.
Train with
15m/s
Train with
25m/s
Test with
15m/s (KNN)
82.27% 74.31%
Test with
15m/s (RF)
80.04% 74.41%
Test with
25m/s (KNN)
66.97% 94.46%
Test with
25m/s (RF)
69.84% 94.61%
Table IV: Classification accuracy percentages while training
lower and higher speed measurements respectively
D. Comparison with Related Work
Figure 8 summarizes the classification accuracy percentages
that are presented above. These are achieved by both the
KNN and the Random Forests algorithm when based only
on the features previously used in the literature for jamming
attack detection [18], compared to the proposed approaches
KNN-VRS and RF-VRS that use the VRS metric. The VRS
metric increases the accuracy of the classifier and ensures
almost perfect differentiation between cases of intentional and
unintentional jamming. When using the VRS metric while
testing with data from the same speed there is an increase
up to about 4% in the classification accuracy. When testing
with data from a different speed, the increase in accuracy is
even greater, up to about 14%.
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Figure 8: Comparison between the standard KNN and RF
classification algorithms and the proposed KNN-VRS, RF-
VRS algorithms based on the accuracy percentage achieved
in every case presented in all the above confusion matrices.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a method for detecting a specific
type of DoS attack, namely RF jamming, based on cross-
layer supervised machine learning and by exploiting a novel
metric from the application layer, the variations of the relative
speed between the jammer and the target. The relative speed
is passively estimated from the combined value of the desired
and the jamming signal at the target vehicle combined with
metrics from the network and physical layer. To evaluate
the significance of the proposed metric and its estimation
algorithm, we implemented three different scenarios - two with
a jammer present and one with interference only.
With our work, we introduced a proactive approach against
potential RF jamming attacks which is able to differentiate
benign from malicious RF jamming, that is interference from
jamming. Additionally, it is able to distinguish the unique char-
acteristics of each attack, especially when the off-line training
is conducted with a higher speed than 15m/s. Through our
evaluation results, we were able to highlight the vital role of
the relative speed and its variations from the application layer,
in addition to other metric from the physical layer, in jamming
detection and unintentional jamming cases differentiation, as
well as in the overall increase in the prediction accuracy.
As part of our future work, we plan to use this classification
process for a vehicular network with a large number of
communicating nodes, as in a broadcast form. The target
of this classification process will be the characterization of
the behaviour of a node as malicious or not, mainly using
the proposed VRS metric. The classification results can be
collected from a Trusted Central Authority (TCA) in an area
with V2X communication.
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